Abstract. This paper deals with the use of the CAPM for capital budgeting purposes. Four different measures are deductively drawn from this model: the disequilibrium Net Present Value, the equilibrium Net Present Value, the disequilibrium Net Future Value, the equilibrium Net Future Value. While all of them may be used for accept-reject decisions, only the equilibrium Net Present Value and the disequilibrium Net Future Value may be used for valuation, given that they are additive. However, despite their additivity, the latter are not always reliable metrics, because they do not signal arbitrage opportunities whenever there is some state of nature for which they are decreasing functions with respect to the end-ofperiod cash flow. In this case, the equilibrium value of a project is not the price it would have if it were traded in the security market. This result is the capital-budgeting counterpart of Dybvig and Ingersoll's (1982) result.
Introduction
The use of the CAPM for capital budgeting traces back to the 60s and 70s, when various authors developed a theoretical link between this asset pricing model and corporate capital budgeting decisions. Among the several contributions one finds classical papers of foremost authorities such as Tuttle and Litzenberger (1968) , Hamada (1969) , Mossin (1969) , Litzenberger and Budd (1970) , Stapleton, (1971 Stapleton, ( , 1974 , Rubinstein (1973) , Hass (1973, 1974) , Bogue and Roll (1974) . The decision criteria these authors present are seemingly different, but, logically, they are equivalent (see Senbet and Thompson, 1978) and may be framed in terms of risk-adjusted cost of capital (see Magni, 2007a) : the resulting criterion suggests that, as long as the CAPM assumptions are met, a firm aiming at maximizing share price should undertake a project if and only if the project's risk-adjusted cost of capital exceeds the project's expected internal rate of return. These classical papers are aimed at formally deducting a decision rule from the CAPM, but do not particularly focus on project valuation; although the net-present-value rule is often reminded, no explicit claim is made that the risk-adjusted cost of capital may or may not be used for valuing projects. The risk-adjusted cost of capital is presented as depending on a disequilibrium (i.e. costbased) systematic risk (see Rubinstein, 1973) , but project value is often framed in a certainty-equivalent form (Bogue and Roll, 1974) . As a result, ambiguities arise on the use of the project NPV as a decision rule or as a valuation tool, and uncertainties arise regarding the correct calculation of the NPV, using either the equilibrium or the disequilibrium systematic risk. Furthermore, while most contributions deal with the notion of net present value, the companion notion of net final value is also sometimes used for various purposes: capital budgeting (e.g. Rubinstein, 1973; Weston and Chen, 1980) value-based management (e.g. Young and O'Byrne, 2001) , management accounting (e.g. O'Hanlon and Peasnell, 2002) , actuarial mathematics (Promislow, 2006) . 1 However, no thorough analysis is found in the literature concerning the relation between present values and terminal values.
Only few contributions have drawn attention on these topics. Among these, we find Rendleman's (1978) paper, which deals with the use of cost-based (disequilibrium) covariance terms as opposed to market-determined (equilibrium) covariance terms. The author suggests that if a firm were to rank projects on the basis of excess of internal return over equilibrium (market-determined) return, an incorrect decision would be reached. Weston and Chen (1980) reply that either the disequilibrium or equilibrium return may be used for ranking projects, if appropriate use is made of both. And while the equilibrium form of NPV is widespread for valuation purposes (in the classical certainty-equivalent form), the disequilibrium form of NPV has its own upholders as well among scholars. For example, Bossaerts and Ødegaard (2001) endorse the use of the disequilibrium NPV for valuing projects; Lewellen (1977) uses the disequilibrium NPV to value projects; Jones and Dudley (1978, p. 378) compute the required rate of return of a mispriced asset by discounting cash flows with a cost-based discount rate (thus, they use a disequilibrium NPV); Copeland and Weston use cost-based betas and disequilibrium NPVs for valuing projects in various occasions Weston, 1983, 1988; Weston and Copeland, 1988) . Some other authors are aware that the disequilibrium NPV is often used in finance, and warn against it claiming that this kind of NPV is a common misuse of the NPV rule: Ang and Lewellen (1982, p. 9) explicitly claim that the disequilibrium NPV is the "standard discounting approach" in finance for valuing projects, and show that such a method is incorrect for it leads to nonadditive valuations. Grinblatt and Titman (1998) , being aware that the use of disequilibrium NPVs is extensive, present an example where cost-based betas are used (see their example 10.5) and claim that this procedure is incorrect. Ekern (2006) distinguishes between NPV as a decision rule and NPV as a valuation tool; he states that the disequilibrium NPV is correct for decision but not for valuation, and suggests the use of the equilibrium NPV as well as other several equivalent methods. Magni (2007b Magni ( , 2008 shows that the disequilibrium NPV, though deductively inferred from the CAPM as a decision rule, may not be used for valuation purposes.
This paper, limiting its scope to one-period projects and accept-reject situations, aims at giving some clarification on these issues. In particular it shows that three conceptual categories are involved when the CAPM is used for capital budgeting: equilibrium/disequilibrium, present/future, decision/valuation.
The results obtained inform that if the CAPM assumptions are met in the security market and a firm's objective is to maximize share price, the investor may reliably employ either present of future values, either in equilibrium or disequilibrium format, as long as the resulting values are used for decision-making purposes. If, instead, the purpose is valuation, only the disequilibrium net final value (NFV) and the equilibrium NPV may be used, because the disequilibrium NPV and the equilibrium NFV are not additive.
However, even the equilibrium NPV and the disequilibrium NFV, though additive, have some pitfalls. If there is a state of nature for which they are decreasing functions with respect to the end-of-period cash flow, then valuation is unreliable. This result is just the capital-budgeting version of a result found in Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) concerning asset pricing in complete markets, and explains why the equilibrium value of a project is not always the price it would have if it were traded in the security market.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1 definitions of net present values and net future values, in either equilibrium or disequilibrium format, are given. In section 2 four decision criteria are formally deducted assuming that the CAPM assumptions are met. In section 3 the equilibrium NPV and the disequilibrium NFV are shown to be additive, whereas the disequilibrium NPV and the equilibrium NFV are shown to be nonadditive. Section 4 shows that additivity does not guarantee absence of arbitrage and that the two additive measures previously found may be in some cases misleading. Section 5 shows that the equilibrium value of a project is not necessarily the value a project would have if it were traded in the security market. Some remarks conclude the paper. Equilibrium in the security market is assumed throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified. Main notational conventions are placed in Table 0 . 
Equilibrium and disequilibrium, present and future
where i is the (opportunity) cost of capital. The NFV of project Z is just the NPV compounded at the cost of capital:
(1.2)
is the project rate of return, the NFV may be rewritten in excess-return form:
( 1 . 3 ) Therefore, the NPV is just the present value of the project excess return, calculated at the cost of capital:
( 1 . 4 ) Under certainty, the NPV is the current project (net) value, the NFV (excess return) is the end-of-period project (net) value. In terms of decisions, the NPV and the NFV have the same sign (as long as (1+i) > 0)
so that a project is worth undertaking if and only if the NPV and the NFV are positive. The NPV and NFV are twin notions: both may interchangeably be used as decision rules and valuation tools.
Under uncertainty, if the CAPM is used for measuring risk, the notions of NPV and NFV are not univocal.
Depending on whether disequilibrium covariance terms or equilibrium covariance terms are used, we find disequilibrium or equilibrium NPVs and NFVs. We then give the following definitions: 
(1.5)
The first addend is the disequilibrium value of the project, so that 
. Therefore, we may write, in an excess-return format,
given by the compounded eNPV Z :
or, using the relation
(1.10) Remark 1.1 The project's expected rate of return differs from both the disequilibrium rate of return and the equilibrium rate of return. For the sake of clarity, the three rates of return may be written as
equilibrium rate of return (1.13) (see also Weston and Chen, 1980, p. 12) . The disequilibrium rate of return in (1.12) is the risk-adjusted cost of capital introduced in the classical contributions cited above (see Rubinstein, 1973 The following section shows that the proliferation of measures under uncertainty, while surprising, is harmless in accept-reject decisions, for all of them are validly deducted by the CAPM and the assumption of share price maximization.
The four decision rules
This section shows that the four indexes above introduced are logically equivalent as decision rules in accept-reject situations. To begin with, we have the following 
After acceptance of the project, the new equilibrium value is set as
2 It is worth reminding that if the project lies on the Security Market Line (SML), then 
Having determined the new price o l P and the number o l N of stocks issued, the latter boils down
and, using
From Lemma 2.1, four decision rules are deducted. In particular, we have the following 
(2.5)
Proof: Using eq. (2.1) and the fact that
( 2 . 6 ) Finally, we have 
we have (assuming the market is in equilibrium) 5 and the investor will therefore employ the equilibrium NPV or the equilibrium NFV. In both cases the decision maker is reliably supported by a pair of metrics that lead to correct decisions.
Nonadditivity
This section shows that the disequilibrium NFV and the equilibrium NPV are additive, whereas the disequilibrium NPV and the equilibrium NFV are nonadditive. NPV additivity means (analogously for the NFV). Therefore, to show nonadditivity it suffices to provide a counterexample, i.e. a pair of projects (or a class of pairs of projects) for which eq. (3.1) does not hold. 
If the disequilibrium NPV were additive, then eq. (3.1) would hold and ) , ( k h f would be constant under changes in h and k (in particular, we would have Table 1 ) we have 
Manipulating algebraically, we find
which, in general, are not identically zero.
Q.E.D. Table 2 summarizes the results obtained, showing that additivity is, so to say, two-dimensional, depending on the two pairs equilibrium/disequilibrium and present/future. Table 3 illustrates a numerical example where a decision maker is supposed to be evaluating two risky projects. The security market is composed, for the sake of simplicity, of a single risky security (so that its Remark 3.1 It is worth noting that the the dNFV and the eNPV are risk-free-related, so to say, in the sense that the equilibrium Net Present Value is just the discounted value of the disequilibrium Net Future Value, where the discount rate is the risk-free rate of the security market:
Referring to the example of as before acceptance of the project. If he invests the proceeds at the risk-free rate, he will have, at the end of the period, a certain amount equal to
where we have used eq. (2.6) and eq. (3.2). By undoing the increase in the firm value, the investor will assure himself an arbitrage profit equal to that part of the dNFV corresponding to his investment in the firm. To put it differently, the dFNV is the (total) arbitrage profit shareholders get at the end of the period if the project is undertaken.
Remark 3.2
The dNPV and the eNFV may only be used as decision rules. 6 However, nonadditivity has something to do with decision as well. Given an investment, eq. (2.4) does hold, but dealing with two investments to be both accepted or rejected (or an investment composed of two sub-investments), one may not deduce that the portfolio of the two projects is profitable if the sum of the two NPVs is positive. In other words, before applying eq. (2.4), one must first consider the overall cash flows deriving from the two investments, and only afterwards compute the NPV. To calculate the NPV of each investment and then sum the NPVs is not compatible with Proposition 2.1. This boils down to saying that the disequilibrium NPV is dangerous if used for decision purposes, because decision makers coping with two or more projects (or a single project that is composed of several sub-projects) may be tempted to first compute the NPV of each project and then sum the NPVs. This procedure may lead to a different sign than the one obtained with the correct procedure. It is easy to show that there may be instances where the sign of 
Decreasing net values and project valuation
The previous sections have shown that the eNPV and the dNFV are legitimately deducted from the CAPM not only as decision rules but also as valuation tools. In other words, they provide the project value (current and future respectively). This section shows that, despite their additivity, the eNPV or dNFV may be misleading in some cases.
Consider a project whose random end-of-period payoff is
The project disequilibrium NFV and the project equilibrium NPV may be represented as functions of n variables:
where p k is the probability of state k. For functions (4.1) and (4.2) to provide correct (net) values, they must abide by the no-arbitrage principle. In other words, increasing end-of-period cash flows should lead to increasing values, ceteris paribus. Consider two assets Z and W that may be purchased at the same price. 
and, owing to eq. (3.2),
(4.5) Also, it is evident that 7
From a stochastic dominance perspective, note that asset W dominates Z according to both first-order and secondorder stochastic dominance). This means "the more the payoff, the less the value", which is incompatible with an arbitrage-free evaluation. Note that project Z may be seen as the risky security plus an arbitrage profit that pays off nonnegative cash flows in all states and a strictly positive amount of 250 if state 3 occurs.
9 Therefore, project Z must have a higher (net) value than the risky security. Given that the net values of the risky security are zero (for the risky security lies on the SML), project Z's net values must be positive. Both firstorder and second-order stochastic dominance confirm the natural intuition according to which Z dominates the risky security. Yet, both the equilibrium NPV and the disequilibrium NFV are negative. They signal nonprofitability for project Z (the equilibrium value is 52.808, smaller than the cost) or, equivalently, they do not signal that the project gives the investor an arbitrage opportunity. This means that, if the dNPV and the eNFV are not additive, the eNPV and the dNFV have pitfalls as well, even though they are additive.
This enables us to state the following Proposition 4.1 bears relation to a previous result found by Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982, p. 237 
Then there exists an arbitrage opportunity. 10 As a result, the two assumption (a) and (b) in Proposition 4.1 imply that the market is not complete. To understand why, consider that if the market were complete and (b) held, then condition (ii) and (iii) of DIP would hold. But then the market would not be in equilibrium, otherwise arbitrage opportunities would arise (see Dybvig and Ingersoll, 1982, p. 238) .
Therefore assumptions (a) and (b) are only compatible with an incomplete market.
The result presented in Proposition 4.1 is, so to say, the capital-budgeting counterpart of DIP. In particular, while the latter deals with pricing of marketed assets when the security market is complete, the former deals with valuation of nonmarketed assets (projects) when the security market is incomplete. The two Propositions are the two sides of the same coin and the two perspectives are reconciled (see Table 5 ).
Equilibrium value and counterfactual equilibrium price
This section shows that the equilibrium value of a project is not necessarily the value the project would have if it were traded.
Let us consider eq. (1.7) in section 1 above. It says that the eNPV is just the difference between the equilibrium value and the cost of the project: 
(5.1)
In finance, e Z V is known as the "equilibrium value" of the project. It is commonly believed that it is the price the project would have in equilibrium if it were traded in the security market (e.g. Mason and Merton, 1985, pp. 38-39, Smith and Nau, 1995, p. 800) . But this equivalence does not always hold, as Smith and Nau (1995) clearly point out:
We also have some semantic problems defining exactly what is meant by the value of a non-traded project. Earlier the … value of a project was defined as the price the project would have if it were traded in an arbitrage-free market …. This definition does not work well in general because the introduction of the project into the market may create new investment opportunities and change the prices of the traded securities. (Smith and Nau, 1995, p. 804, footnote 7) If the project were traded, a non-trivial re-balancing in the economy would occur (see Ukhov, 2006 , for a derivation of the mean-variance frontier). Let us call "counterfactual equilibrium price" the price the project would have if it were traded: we now illustrate a counterexample where the equilibrium value e Z V differs from the counterfactual equilibrium price. Let us consider project Z introduced in Table 4 . What if one counterfactually assumes that Z is traded in the security market? 11 First of all, note that the introduction of the project in the security market renders the latter a complete market. It is thus evident that project Z's counterfactual equilibrium price cannot coincide with the equilibrium value 808 . 52 = e Z V previously found, otherwise conditions (i)-(iii) of DIP would be satisfied, and arbitrage opportunities would arise (which implies that the market would not be in equilibrium). This means that when the project is introduced in the security market, market prices shift so that the market moves toward a new equilibrium. How does the resulting new equilibrium turns out to be? Intuition would tell us that the risky security's price should decrease to avoid arbitrage (given that the project dominates it), but this is not the case. It is easy to verify that, to avoid condition (iii) of DIP and achieve an equilibrium, the risky security's price must increase and project Z's equilibrium price must increase to a larger extent so as to be greater than the risky security's price.
12 Suppose the new equilibrium is as represented in Table 6 . The (counterfactual) equilibrium price of project Z is 121.57 and the price of the risky security is now 65.76.
The market is now complete and arbitrage is not possible. The counterfactual equilibrium price of the project differs from the equilibrium value of the project (121.57 ≠ 52.808). The conclusion is that the equilibrium value in eq. (5.1) is not the price the project would have if it were traded in the market.
Contrary to the equilibrium value, the counterfactual equilibrium price is rational by definition, in the sense that arbitrage is not possible in the resulting equilibrium. This means that the counterfactual equilibrium price is obviously the correct value of the project.
One might think that, for valuation to be correct, one should replace the equilibrium value with the counterfactual equilibrium price. Unfortunately the counterfactual equilibrium price cannot be univocally determined. Table 7 shows another possible equilibrium for the market where project Z is traded. The equilibrium counterfactual price in this second equilibrium is equal to 76.197, which not simply conflicts with the equilibrium value of the project, but differs form the counterfactual equilibrium price previously found. Which one of the two counterfactual equilibrium prices is the one to be used for valuation? The answer is not possible, because there is no way of anticipating how equilibrium is reached from a disequilibrium situation. That is, one cannot compute ex ante "the" equilibrium price the project would have if it were traded in the security market. However, from a practical point of view, one may collect statistical data and make an ex ante estimation of the most probable equilibrium the market would reach. In this case, the estimated counterfactual equilibrium price could be taken as the correct project value.
13
Remark 5.1 Proposition 4.1 just gives us the reason why the equilibrium value may sometimes turn out to be incorrect. The correct value measuring increase in shareholders' wealth is indeed given by the equilibrium value if the market is complete and in equilibrium. Problems in project valuation arise only when the market is not complete and condition (4.3) holds. 14 In this case, equilibrium value and counterfactual equilibrium price are not equal. A project's equilibrium value is therefore reliable only if the market is complete; in this case it does represent the (counterfactual) equilibrium price that the project would actually have if it were traded.
15

Conclusions
The CAPM is a theoretical model aimed at valuing financial assets in a security market under the assumption that the market is in equilibrium. As widely known, the CAPM may also be used for capital budgeting purposes: a project is worth undertaking if and only if the project expected rate of return is greater than the (cost-based) risk-adjusted cost of capital (Rubinstein, 1973) . However, the role of this simple capital budgeting criterion has not been thoroughly investigated, so that errors and misunderstanding often arise in financial textbooks and papers, where the CAPM is incorporated in the net present value criterion in an unclear way, with no explicit indication of 13 From a theoretical point of view, upper and lower bound can be computed for the counterfactual equilibrium price (Smith and Nau, 1995) , but whenever the cost is greater than the lower limit and smaller than the upper limit, the "optimal strategy is unclear" (Smith and Nau, 1995, p. 805 ), and decision is not possible (a further analysis must be conducted to reach a single estimated value). 14 It is worth reminding that if the market is complete and in equilibrium, condition (4.3) may not hold (given that the equivalent condition (iii) of DIP may not hold). Conversely, if the market is not complete and in equilibrium, condition (4.3) may hold, as we have seen. 15 Readers interested in the analytical expression of the mean-variance frontier when the set of risky assets is expanded by a o the way it should be computed (use of disequilibrium data versus equilibrium data), o the purpose it serves (decision or valuation)
o the relation excess return (net future value) bears to present value. This paper, focusing on accept-reject situations and one-period projects, is just a first step toward a clarification of these issues. In particular, it shows that:
• from the CAPM four decision rules are validly deducted: the disequilibrium Net Present Value, the equilibrium Net Future Value, the equilibrium Net Present Value, the disequilibrium Net Future
Value. All of them may be interchangeably used for decision-making • only the equilibrium NPV and the disequilibrium NFV are additive, which means that they may be used for valuation purposes. The other two are not valuation tools • while logically impeccable as decision tools, the disequilibrium NPV (equilibrium NFV) may lead to incorrect decisions if decision makers facing a portfolio of several projects (or a project composed of several sub-projects) separately compute each project's NPV (NFV) and then sum the values obtained. The correct procedure is: to sum the cash flows of the projects and then compute the NPV (NFV)
• even if the market is in equilibrium, the project's equilibrium NPV and disequilibrium NFV lead to an incorrect valuation whenever they are decreasing functions with respect to end-of-period cash flow in some state of nature (which implies that the security market is incomplete). This result is the capital-budgeting equivalent of Dybvig and Ingersoll's (1982) result, which they find under the assumption of a complete market • if the above stated condition holds, the correct value would be given by the (counterfactual) equilibrium price the project would have if it were traded in the security market. Unfortunately, this price is not univocally determined ex ante and one can only rely on an estimated equilibrium price based on exogenous data about the market. 
